Mokka is a PC (CAP theorem) consensus algorithm for handling replicated logs in open networks. This algorithm has some common approaches nested from RAFT, but its nature and design make Mokka a better solution in the following cases: storing sensitive historical data, ability to work in the trustless environment, ability to append logs from all nodes in the cluster. To make it possible to work in a trustless environment, mokka use cryptography algorithms for data validation and voting handling. The data storage is maintained through the Merkle tree, which makes it impossible to erase/rewrite part of the logs and achieve any inconsistent state. The logs, proposed from the followers, are handled thanks to gossip protocol, which brings a better approach to avoiding losing logs during node failure.
Introduction
Replicated state machine (RSM) protocols allow a collection of nodes to share the same state and act as a state machine. This state machine should tolerate non-byzantine node failures and communication problems. The protocols guarantee safety regarding node crashing, message loss, problems with delivery, and ability to work even when 51% of total nodes are operating (i.e. (N+1)/2).
The complexity of RSM protocols is completely based on the challenge. From this point, it's important to state, that all of the protocols, first of all, try to solve the CAP (Consistence -Availability -Partition tolerance) theorem. This theorem state, that in distributed systems you can achieve PA or PC properties, but won't be able to achieve all 3. As a result, before moving to the implementation part, we have to think about choosing the right model of leadership.
The algorithms like RAFT or PAXOS has PC properties. They have achieved that by introducing the single leader, which decide on state modification and able to modify the state, while other nodes in the system have to apply the changes. Such way of leadership allows to avoid data collision, merges, or state rollback issues. All of the problems above may arise only when several nodes in cluster try to apply changes to the same record, or append their records but in a different order.
The backside of single leadership is scaling. The problem of scaling rise, when there are around 100+ members in the network, and they locate in different regions. The limitation like network latency may impact on the speed of appending new logs or can spoil the voting process (in case voting has a timeout). Furthermore, in single leader-based consensus engines, the follower nodes usually have a passive behavior, which means, that logs are appending / reappending and detection of missed logs -is completely becoming the leader problem. So, achieving the higher speed will lead to some optimizations regarding logs appending, or just to switching to PA from PC.
Another problem related to RSM algorithms lies in keeping strong history. Most other RSM protocols use timestamp and index, to detect the order of logs. However, according to this approach, the history of logs may become inconsistent, as there is no relation between the previous log and the current one, except the number. This can lead to partial history rewriting during leader change (when a new leader has a lower history than the previous one), or during the split and merge of the network.
Mokka aims to solve most of the described problems above by introducing some novel features: 1) Safe log append: Mokka use Merkle tree + term index to handle the history of replicated logs 2) Secured voting: the voting process happens with double validation. The first validation includes checking that the current vote is still active and has been started by the legal node. The second validation happens during voting and includes checking that right node voted for the current round. 3) Secured log appending: each write request includes the voting signature, in order to validate that log has been committed by the leader in this round (i.e., term) 4) Pending logs: each node can promote logs, which will be shared across all members and stay in mempool until the leader commits them
Nodes

About
Node, regarding RSM algorithm, is a peer or network's member who is responsible for handling replicated logs. Based on the role of the node, it can promote, commit or append the logs to its state.
Node's representation in network
Mokka uses the extended representation of addressing. This includes the combination of protocol, address, and public key. Therefore, during boot, each node has a list of known peers, its address and public key.
As each action, which can change system state (i.e., log appending and voting), should be validated, mokka use asymmetric cryptography, in order to sign each action. This helps followers to make sure, that certain packet has been signed by a known peer, and help leader to make sure, that vote has been received from the right node.
Roles
Mokka has completely the same roles as RAFT, but their rights may differ: 1) Leader: the leader node can propose and commit new logs. However, the leader doesn't track the actual state of each follower. Instead, when follower send the signal to the leader (as a reply to heartbeat) with his current state, and in case the state is outdated, the leader sends missed logs to the follower. Also, the leader can vote for the candidates 2) Follower: the follower can propose logs to the leader (via gossip protocol). Also, the follower can start the voting process for him (In this case the node's state changes to the candidate) 3) Candidate: the candidate can handle the voting process, collect new votes and build a special "proof," which is used during logs appending process (to ensure, that this node is a leader and can commit the certain log). Once the candidate receives enough positive votes -it becomes the leader and starts committing new logs. Otherwise, the candidate change its state to the follower
Heartbeat
The heartbeat process is the process for monitoring the state of certain node/nodes. In some RSM algorithms, like Paxos or RAFT, this approach is used for monitoring the leader node. So, other members in the network became aware, that current leader is down and started voting for choosing a new leader.
The heartbeat may be active and passive. In the first case, the heartbeat signal is sent from the follower node to the leader node, to obtain the state. In the second case -the opposite happens, and the leader sends the signal to all followers in the network.
Mokka has taken the RAFT approach and chosen the behavior when the leader sends his heartbeat state to the followers. However, besides just tracking the state, mokka also use the heartbeat for synchronization purpose (section 4.3).
Voting
About
The voting process is a process, which helps members in the network to decide which node will do a certain action. In the case with Mokka and some other RSM algorithms as RAFT, the voting helps to choose the leader node. This process also helps to reach the consensus, by giving the right to commit new logs to the valid node. There is no general rule for the voting process; however in most RSM algorithms, to apply any change, you have to reach the quorum (i.e., 51% of votes).
Voting process
During the vote, the candidate generates the Shamir's secret (SSSS), where the amount of pieces is equal to the number of nodes in the network. The secret is generated by the TOTP token. The TOTP secret should be known by all peers (it's private). Then these parts are going to be sorted, and all parts, except the last one, are sent to the follower nodes. The last piece -is the leader piece.
When the follower receives the vote signal with his shared secret part, it validates that candidate may become the leader. This may happen in the following cases:
1) You have the same history (which can be validated by Merkle root) 2) In case the index of the candidate is higher than the follower's one -we compare the history. In case the history is the same, the node votes as true, otherwise -false 3) In case the history of the candidate is lower -vote false After the follower went through the rules, described above and decided will the candidate become a leader or not, it signs his shared part of secret with his private key and sends back the vote decision alongside with his signed payload. Then the candidate validates the signature and replies from the node. In case the signature is wrong -the candidate ignores the vote. Otherwise, the voting happens.
During the voting process, we await until a timeout happens, or we reach the minimum quorum for changing leader. After quorum is reached, the leader node prepares the proof. The proof includes the amount of quorum, signatures of each node (the signature of part of a secret) and timestamp (start vote time). This proof is then used by the leader for committing purpose.
The leader validation happens during write operations only (i.e., append logs). The process for the follower looks like so: the follower decode the proof, restore the TOTP token based on secret and start date, then check the signatures (that all signatures are from known peers), and then check that last signature belongs to the leader (to whom, who created the sent log). The signature checking process happens through the public key restoration.
Voting types
In previous topics, we've described the voting as the process to reach the consensus and take right ownership to a valid node. But, we haven't mentioned, when the voting happens.
In mokka, like in RAFT, the voting happens, when current leader stopped sending the heartbeat The voting process in mokka splits into two types -"by proposing" and "by timeout." The first one works when a node has some commands, which needs to be pushed. This process runs the immediate voting process for this node. However, this voting round may fail due to the following scenarios:
1) The current master node is still pushing new records. We track it by the timestamp of last created log. In case the log has been created earlier, than maximum election timeout possible (i.e., Current date -timestamp < max election timeout), the voting will fail 2) Someone else already started voting for the current term and received the voice 3) The candidate has already been voted for several rounds, and rounds were unsuccessful. In this case, we treat him like the malicious node and block him for the next several rounds.
The second type of voting happens by timeout (like in RAFT). The decision to leave both types of voting has been approved by log append mechanism. So, during any voting, we were a candidate, validate our state towards other nodes.
Security and cryptography 4.1 About
The security part of mokka represents a set of rules devoted to protect the system from malicious behavior, like fake voting or appending wrong history or logs. As a result, the security aspect touch all actions, which change the system state (i.e. voting and appending). The basic rule for all actions is that they shouldn't be anonymous. For this purpose, mokka use the asymmetric cryptography and sign each action. Based on the signature mokka can restore the public key and validate the peer, who sent certain commit / vote / do any other kind of action.
Beside asymmetric cryptography, mokka also use the properties of SSS scheme for voting and validation purpose. This validation helps safely commit, because each committed record is signed by the quorum of nodes.
Generating Shamir's secret
The Shamir's secret sharing is a cryptography algorithm, which allows sharing secret by dividing it into parts and giving each member his unique part of the encrypted secret. The idea of this algorithm is in the restoration of the secret. According to this algorithm, you can create an N amount of shares, but to restore the secret you only need M shares (for instance 3 of 5).
The key idea of the algorithm is to turn the secret into a point on the graph and come up with the polynomial function, with k-1 degree. The arguments of the polynomial function are other randomly chosen points, whose combination (like 3 of 5) and applying over this polynomial function will return our original secret. Another interesting thing about the SSSS scheme is that each share will be the same size as the original secret. That means that it's harder to steal the secret even if you know half of the required shares to reconstruct it.
In mokka, the SSSS algorithm is used for handling the voting process. During voting, each follower node receives its part of a generated secret (which holds the candidate). The algorithm generates the secret with an option of possible restoration only if 51% or more of all shares are present. So, in case we have five nodes in the network, and one becomes the candidate, we need at least three shares from 3 nodes (4 followers / 2 + 1) for restoring the secret. In case, some of the nodes will try to send a fake part, the Shamir's algorithm will not be able to restore the secret, and voting will fail.
This a common scenario during the network delays. For instance, some of the members in the network will try to send their vote, while the round has been over and a new one has started. So, it serves not only for security reason but also as a good collision resolver.
Proof generation and validation
As we've mentioned earlier, after the voting process has been over, and other members of network voted for the candidate, the candidate has to build the proof, which he will use on every append of logs.
The proof represents itself a combination of signatures (received from nodes, who voted), shares and timestamp (when voting started). This proof sting may be of a non-static size and depends on the number of nodes in the network (i.e., quorum). So, in the case of a quorum is equal to 3, then the proof will contain three signatures + 3 shares + timestamp.
When the follower receives the append command, it makes the certain validations against the proof, to make sure, that log has been received and committed by a valid leader. The validation process looks like so:
1) The follower restore the original TOTP token through SSS (by using the provided shares)
2) The follower check that TOTP token is valid (validate that token is valid in the certain time window, i.e., timestamp, provided by proof) 3) The follower checks all signatures: by knowing the signature and original signed data, we can restore the public key. This process is also known as "EC recover." The restored public key we then compare with known public keys. In case we meet some unknown public key -the validation fails 4) In case we passed previous steps, we find the last share (sort it), and then recover the public key for the last share. In case the last public key is the public key of the leader -then the validation has been passed
Signing and signature validation
The signing process is not trivial as well. This includes the signing process of the required payload (in our case -the Shamir's share) with the secp256k1 algorithm, recovering public key and validation of sent share by signature.
In mokka, the secp256k1 is used to validate all actions which affect system state (voting, log appending).
To do that, the node signs the information which it wants to propose, and other members in the network validate this information. As a result, each node has two keys pair -public and private. The private key is used for signing, while the public key is used for the validation purpose.
After the certain data has been signed, the signer node sends this data alongside with original data. Thanks to curve properties, we can restore the public key by knowing only signature and original data. This process is also called "public key recover." The main trick here is that the recovered key should be equal to the public key of the node, who signed this payload.
Logs
About
The log -is a structure, which keeps certain change made in RSM. The chain of logs produces the current state of the system. In most RSM systems (except some K-V and PA based), each log has a unique identifier. In Raft and Paxos it is index. In Mokka it is the Merkle root, obtained from current Merkle root (4.7) and a hash of the current log.
Appending logs
After the voting process has been completed, the leader may start appending new logs. When the leader commit the first log for the last term (i.e., current term), alongside with this log, the leader also passes the proof of voting, which includes the last secret and signed shares. Each follower finds the signed share by him, or by any other trusted peer (in case it can't find its share), validate it by checking that certain share has been signed by certain peer (through public key validation). In case all is fine, then the follower node accepts the first log from this leader and allows commit new logs under this term in this commit window.
Heartbeat sync strategy
The heartbeat in mokka close to the concept in RAFT. However, Mokka brings some significant differences to RAFT strategy: in Raft, the leader sends the heartbeat signal to the follower without awaiting any reply from it. So, it can be treated like one-direction communication. In Mokka, the heartbeat signal sent to the follower will end with a reply from the follower (it should be handled async and don't block any other requests from the same follower). This reply is necessary due to the fact, that leader will check the state from the follower on each heartbeat request, instead of keeping the state of certain follower locally.
Appending missed logs
Sometimes, due to network, or bugs in the application, the consensus misses some new logs from the leader node in the network. In this case, the leader can detect the follower node with the outdated state through the heartbeat.
The strategy for obtaining missed logs includes several steps: 1) Leader send the heartbeat signal 2) The follower check the heartbeat packet and compare the state of a leader with his state 3) In case the follower has an outdated state, he sends the packet to the leader with "re append" type 4) The leader sends the next missed log to the follower. So, in case of follower has 200 logs, and leader 203, then the leader will send him missed logs one by one until they reach the consensus However, to avoid recursive reappending, the leader won't resend the logs, the whose committed window hasn't been closed yet. Otherwise, there is a chance, that follower node may try to apply the same log several times (when leader send the committed record, and when this log has been received via heartbeat sync strategy at one time)
Commit window
Quite often, the certain leader may want to commit several new logs to the system, without being interpreted by other nodes. For this purpose, the leader locks its state for a time equal to maximum election time. The lock happens automatically, lasts after voting, and after the last log has been appended. During this lock, other followers can't become the candidates, nor vote for someone.
Follower commit
The main advantage of mokka is an ability to propose new logs to the leader from every node in the cluster. This happens thanks to gossip protocol. The main concept is that every node sends a log to the temp pool of logs (i.e., pending logs) and replicate them between all node in the cluster. Once the leader receives the pending log, it commits this log and sends to all nodes in the cluster. Once the follower receives the certain log, it checks log's hash against hashes of logs in temp pool. In case it found the log in temp pool, then follower pull this log from temp pool. However, the leader has another rule: it doesn't send any logs to temp pool, but append it and send to other nodes directly.
This approach with gossip protocol allow not only publish logs without delay, but also it solves the problem with follower's failures: in case the follower falls, another follower will have its pending logs, and maintain them until leader will append them.
Log's history
The history of logs is represented as the Merkle tree. This structure allows us to make sure, that logs were appended in the right order, and all logs between all members in the network are the same. This helps to avoid branching and history rewriting.
The Merkle tree is built up of the history of logs, where each leaf in Merkle tree -is a hash of log's command. During each append, the hash is calculated on node locally. The calculation includes hashing of log and appending this hash to the current Merkle root, which produces the new Merkle root. This Merkle root is compared with Merkle root, which we've received from leader node alongside with log. In case Merkle root on follower node and Merkle root on leader node are not the same, then we perform rollback strategy. Otherwise we append the log from the leader.
The rollback strategy works as follow: After each voting process, the new leader node may commit the new log. In case it commits the log, each follower node marks the received log as the head log, received for this term. During rollback, in case we notice that root is not the same, we perform delete of last appended record and asking the leader to provide us previous log + its last (which we failed to append). Now let's assume that the last committed record of the previous term differs as well. In this case, we won't delete one log, but all logs up to the last record for the previous term -1. The process can happen over and over until we will reach the same point of history with the leader, or until all logs will be removed from this follower node.
Such an approach can help to solve the issue, happened to most current consensus algorithms, related to history merging. For instance, RAFT uses the index of the log as the main identifier for the log. In this case, let's image, that our network has been suddenly split into two parts. In the first network, the nodes committed 120 records, while in second network the nodes committed 200 records. All this happens under the same term. Now, we merge the network back. According to RAFT, the leader node will be selected the node with a bigger amount of logs (i.e., by index). In this case, only 80 logs will be treated as missed and appended. However, previous 120 logs may be completely different in two or more nodes in the cluster.
This fine, when logs contain only some meta info, but it's not the right behavior when you try to run some expert system, which makes a conclusion based on previous input.
Security
Compromising network
In consensus systems, most attacks are closely connected with an ability to rewrite the state of nodes. This kind of attacks may vary and even be specific to RSM implementation. Below are listed the possible cases, applied to Mokka: 1) 51% attack: this is attack when most peers in the network become malicious. However, in Mokka, this attack may be successful only in case the attacker got access not only to nodes but also to their private keys and TOTP secret. Otherwise, even if the attacker will be able to send packets from these nodes, the attack won't pass as other peers use proof for validation of every change in RSM. 2) Sybil attack: This attack happens when bad peers treat with others nodes, like they have a more recent state, and try to append this bad state to other nodes in the network. This attack may be successful in Mokka, but only in case most of the nodes will have a wrong history (this means, that these logs have to be added manually to each node's database, and attacker should have the private keys and TOTP secret). Otherwise, it won't be possible. 3) Network split and merge: this kind of attack happens, when network between nodes split, and some of the nodes become isolated from each other. The thing about this attack, that most other RSM implementation will continue to work and even may append new logs to the system. This can lead to partial state consistency when networks will merge into one and nodes will start voting for the right history. In mokka, thanks to SSS scheme, it won't be possible, and in split network, the nodes will stop committing new logs, they will be able just to push them to temp pool of logs (via gossip protocol), and once the network will merge again -the leader node will receive all missed logs (via gossip) and append them one by one.
